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I.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The current matter arises out of a settlement reached during a court-ordered mediation 
between Defendants/Respondents Dinius & Associates, PLLC and Kevin Dinius and 
Plaintiff/Appellant David Kosmann before Judge Stephen Dunn. (R. Vol. 2 p. 106).  Defendants 
disagree with Kosmann’s rendition of what transpired during and after the mediation. Contrary to 
Kosmann’s assertions, the mediation resulted in a valid and enforceable settlement being placed 
on the record. Kosmann and his counsel ratified the settlement and effectively waived any 
objections they may have had to the circumstances surrounding the parties’ meeting which lead 
to the settlement. As is explained herein, the District Court correctly applied Idaho law when it 
ruled the settlement enforceable. It also properly exercised its discretion in denying Kosmann’s 
motion for sanctions against Defendants and their counsel. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Defendants represented Kosmann in a 2013 civil litigation suit filed against Leo Gilbride 
(Canyon County Case No. CV-2013-795). (R. Vol. 1, p. 3). The litigation before the trial court 
lasted two years, involved substantial briefing practice, went to trial, then concluded over two 
years later through motion practice. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-20). While Kosmann paid a portion of 
Defendants’ legal fees, he failed to pay the entirety of the fees owed. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 32-33). 
Therefore, following the conclusion of the 2013 litigation, in compliance with Idaho law, 
Defendants filed an attorney-fees lien related to the outstanding attorney fees owed to them. Id. 
Kosmann thereafter initiated litigation against Defendants wherein he pled claims of alleged 
attorney malpractice (Canyon County Case No. CV-2017-568). (R. Vol. 2 pp. 12-71). In an 
 




effort to resolve all claims between the parties, the District Court ordered the parties to attend 
mediation with Judge Stephen Dunn. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 106-108). 
The mediation occurred on July 26, 2017. (R. Vol. 3 p. 21 ¶2). Dinius attended the 
mediation on behalf of the Defendants and was represented by Yvonne Dunbar. Kosmann 
attended the mediation with his counsel, Loren Messerly.1  (Ex. pp. 1-6; R. Vol. 3 p. 191 ¶2, p. 
240 ¶3). Throughout the course of the mediation, Defendants and Kosmann were located in 
separate rooms and Judge Dunn would move between the two rooms in trial to reach a 
resolution. (R. Vol. 3 p. 250 ¶¶3-5, p. 240 ¶¶4-6). When the mediation was at a stalemate, Judge 
Dunn persistently requested that Dinius meet with Kosmann. (R. Vol. 3 p. 195 ¶12, p. 200 ¶6). 
After repeatedly declining Judge Dunn’s invitation, Dinius ultimately reluctantly agreed to do so. 
Id. During that meeting, Dinius and Kosmann cleared the air between them and came to a mutual 
resolution of their respective claims. (R. Vol. 3 p. 195 ¶12, p. 200-201, ¶8). Following that 
meeting, the parties each met with their respective counsel and were able to discuss the voluntary 
settlement reached by Dinius and Kosmann. (R. Vol. 3 p. 92 ¶37, p.94 ¶46, Ex. p. 3 L6:4-6). The 
settlement was thereafter placed on the record by Judge Dunn and the parties. (Ex. pp. 1-6). 
Judge Dunn asked defense counsel to draft a written settlement agreement memorializing the 
settlement terms placed on the record. (R. Vol. 3 p. 21, ¶3). 
Defense counsel did as requested by Judge Dunn. (R. Vol. 3 p. 22, ¶4). However, the 
parties were unable to agree on the language of the written settlement agreement. (R. Vol. 3 p. 
22-24, ¶4-11). As such, on August 2, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to enforce the settlement 
entered on the record and noticed it to be heard on August 31, 2017. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 4-5, 110-111). 
                                                 
1 Unbeknownst to Defendants and their counsel, Kosmann’s girlfriend also attended the 
mediation.  Her attendance was not disclosed to Defendants and their counsel until after the 
conclusion of the mediation. 
 




The next day, Kosmann filed a cross-motion to enforce an unidentified settlement. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 
4, 110-111). Kosmann, however, never filed memorandum in support of his cross-motion nor did 
he ever notice his cross-motion for hearing. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 4-10). Therefore, Kosmann’s cross-
motion was never properly before the District Court. 
Kosmann thereafter opposed Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement on the 
ground that he believed the agreed-upon settlement amount was greater than the amount 
identified by the parties on the record. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 4, 169-178).  Kosmann did not claim that 
Dinius’ meeting with Kosmann occurred in violation of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 
or that the alleged Rule violation invalidated the settlement agreement. Id. Instead, Kosmann 
waited until the August 31st hearing to first raise his claim of an alleged IRPC 4.2 violation and 
waited until after the hearing to initially argue the agreement was void for public policy reasons. 
(Tr. pp. 6-8 at L. 7:10-15:19; R. Vol. 2 pp. 118-126). Doing so was improper as these arguments 
were not timely raised in Kosmann’s opposition materials. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 169-178). 
Following the August 31, 2017 hearing, without first seeking leave from the District 
Court, Kosmann filed an untimely supplemental opposition brief which he incorrectly titled 
“Supplemental Brief in Support of David Kosmann’s Motion to Enforce Agreement” (hereinafter 
“Supplemental Brief”). (R. Vol. 2 pp. 118-126). In his August 31st Supplemental Brief, Kosmann 
argued, for the first time, his claims that the settlement was void for public policy because Dinius 
and Dunbar purportedly violated IRPC 4.2 and 8.4 when Dinius met with Kosmann at Judge 
Dunn’s request during the mediation. Id. As this Supplemental Brief and the legal arguments 
contained therein were not raised in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3), 
Defendants moved to strike the Supplemental Brief.  (R. Vol. 3 pp. 203-208). 
 




In response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike, Kosmann filed a motion for leave to file his 
supplemental brief on September 6, 2017. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 209-212). In support of his motion for 
leave, Kosmann failed to explain why he did not complete the legal research at issue or present 
his IRPC 4.2 and public policy argument at least 7 days prior to the August 31st hearing. (R. Vol. 
3 pp. 209-219).  
On September 14, 2017, the Court set an October 2, 2017 hearing on the parties’ various 
pending motions. (R. Vol. 2 p. 6). On September 20th, Kosmann filed Kosmann’s Motion for 
Sanctions Against Dinius and Dunbar for Obtaining a Settlement Through Unethical Behavior 
and Then Repeatedly Refusing to Admit and Remedy Their Violations, at Great Expense to 
Kosmann (“Motion for Sanctions”) as well as a motion to shorten time to have that motion also 
heard during the October 2nd hearing.2 (R. Vol. 3 pp. 231-237). Defendants opposed Kosmann’s 
motion for leave. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 130-132). Given that they were unaware whether the District 
Court would hear Kosmann’s untimely Supplemental Brief on October 2nd, on September 27, 
2018, Defendants also filed supplemental reply materials wherein they responded to the new 
arguments presented in Kosmann’s Supplemental Brief. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 238-269). As Rule 
7(b)(3)(C) allows a party to file reply materials up to two business days prior to a hearing, 
Defendants supplemental reply materials were timely filed.   
In their briefing, Defendants argued, inter alia, Kosmann’s IRPC violation arguments 
should be disregarded since they were not timely raised and Kosmann failed to establish 
                                                 
2 Based upon Kosmann’s argument on appeal related to the Rule 11(c) “safe harbor 
provision”, Kosmann’s Motion for Sanctions was filed in contravention of that Rule. Kosmann 
did not reach out to the Defendants at least twenty-one days prior to September 20, 2017 to ask 
them to with their Motion to Enforce Settlement due to his allegations that the Kosmann-Dinius 
meeting violated IRPC 4.2.  In fact, the first time Kosmann mentioned any alleged IRPC 4.2 
violation was before the District Court on August 31, 2017, which is less than 21 days prior to 
September 20, 2017.  
 




excusable neglect as required by Rule 2.2(b)(1)(B). (R. Vol. 2 pp. 130-132; R. Vol. 3 pp. 260-
262). Defendants also presented arguments why Kosmann’s arguments were substantively 
inaccurate, including, but not limited to: (1) Kosmann waived his objections to the settlement 
agreement entered on the record and any alleged IRPC violation when they ratified and assented 
to the settlement agreement; (2) an alleged IRPC violation did not provide a public policy basis 
for invalidating it; and (3) the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence of an IRPC 
4.2 violation. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 262-267). 
At the October 2, 2017 hearing, the District Court granted Kosmann’s motion for leave; 
found Defendants’ motion to strike was moot; provided Defendants until October 13th to file any 
further responsive supplemental briefing; and awarded Defendants the attorney’s fees they 
expended in filing the motion to strike Plaintiff’s untimely supplemental brief. (Tr. p.37 L.21 -
p.39 L. 9). On October 13, 2017, Defendants timely filed their Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Supplemental Brief which augmented their prior August 17, 2017, August 29, 2017, and 
September 27, 2017 filings. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 270-273). In addition to the arguments previously 
raised, Defendants pointed out, among other things, Kosmann had not presented a proper public 
policy argument because he did not claim the settlement agreement on its face violated public 
policy. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 272-273).  
On October 17, 2017, Kosmann noticed his motion for sanctions for a November 8, 2017 
hearing. (R. Vol. 2 p. 7). Defendants subsequently filed their own motion for sanctions against 
Plaintiff and his counsel to also be heard on November 8, 2017. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 274-288). Prior to 
the hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for sanctions, the District Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Order to Release Funds 
 




(“Memorandum Decision and Order”).  (R. Vol. 2 pp. 142-161). A copy of that decision was 
provided to the parties at the November 8, 2017 hearing. (Tr. p. 11 L. 26:6-27:16). 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court ruled, inter alia: (1) the 
settlement agreement placed on the record before Judge Dunn was enforceable; and (2) Dinius’ 
meeting with Kosmann did not void the settlement agreement for violation of public policy. (R. 
Vol. 2 pp. 148-153). The Court heard the parties’ cross-motions for sanctions on November 8, 
2017. (Tr. p. 11). It thereafter entered its November 22, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Parties’ Cross-Motions for Sanctions (“Cross-Motions for Sanctions Decision”) wherein it 
denied Kosmann’s Motion for Sanctions, denied Defendants’ motion in part, and awarded 
Defendants $200, which represented one billable hour incurred in prosecuting their motion to 
strike. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 162-177).  Judgment was entered on November 22, 2017. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 
178-180). 
Following the District Court’s entry of Judgment, on December 5, 2017, Kosmann filed 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and a Second Supplemental Declaration of David A. Kosmann.  
(R. Vol. 3 pp. 343-354). In his Motion to Reconsider, Kosmann asked the District Court to 
reconsider six discrete decisions, which all related to the Court’s denial of Kosmann’s request for 
sanctions against the Defendants and the Defendants’ request for sanctions against Kosmann and 
his counsel. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 344-345). Kosmann then waited until well after the Rule 11.2(b) 
deadline had passed and filed Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Reconsider 
and the Declaration of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider on December 24, 
2017. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 355-417). On December 27, 2017, Kosmann filed the Exhibits to 
Declaration of Counsel in Support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 418-426). 
 




Because Kosmann’s December 24th and 27th filings were untimely under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11.2(b) and Kosmann failed to establish excusable neglect for his failure to 
timely file the same, Defendants moved to strike the same as well as any consideration of the 
new arguments raised in the memorandum. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 427-443). In his untimely filed 
memorandum, Kosmann attempted to have the Court expand its reconsideration review and to 
also reconsider its decisions that: (1) the settlement (as placed on the record) was valid and 
enforceable; (2) the settlement (as placed on the record) was not void for public policy as a result 
of the alleged ethical violations; and (3) its decision not to enforce a purported $40,000 
settlement. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 383-403). Defendants filed their opposition to the Motion to 
Reconsider on January 4, 2018. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 454-470). On January 9, 2018, Kosmann filed his 
reply in support of his Motion to Reconsider. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 485-509).  In his reply brief, 
Kosmann improperly brought new arguments which were not previously raised before the Court, 
including the argument that the sanctions against his counsel violated the “safe harbor provision” 
in Rule 11(c)(2). (R. Vol. 3 pp. 506-507).  As such arguments were not timely raised, the Court 
did not have jurisdiction to consider them. See Taylor v. Riley, 162 Idaho 692, 703–04 (2017). 
While the District Court had originally noticed the Motion to Reconsider for hearing on 
January 11, 2018, the District Court ultimately took the briefing related to Plaintiff’s Motion to 
Reconsider and Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike under advisement. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 9-10). It 
issued its ruling denying Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider in its January 24, 2018 Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Defendants’ Second Motion to 
Strike (“Motion to Reconsider Decision”). (R. Vol. 2 pp. 181-196). In doing so, the District 
Court struck from the record the untimely filed memorandum, declaration of counsel, and 
exhibits to the declaration of counsel as well as inadmissible portions of Second Supplemental 
 




Declaration of David A. Kosmann. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 184-188). The District Court also made the 
following rulings: 
 The settlement agreement placed on the record was enforceable; 
 Kosmann knowingly and willingly entered into the settlement agreement after 
consulting with his attorney; 
 Whether IRPC 4.2 was violated by Dinius, who was represented by counsel, is a 
matter of first impression in Idaho; 
 It was unnecessary for the Court to determine whether IRPC 4.2 was actually 
violated when ruling on either the parties’ cross-motions to enforce settlement or 
the parties’ cross-motions for sanctions; 
 The Court properly exercised its discretion in declining to impose sanctions 
against Defendants where it determined IRCP 11 was not violated; and  
 The Court properly exercised its discretion in imposing a $200 sanction against 
Plaintiff’s counsel. 
(R. Vol. 2 pp. 188-195). 
On January 31, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal wherein he seeks to appeal the 
District Court’s November 2, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order, November 22, 2017 
Cross-Motions for Sanctions Decision, November 22, 2017 Judgment, and January 24, 2018 
Motion to Reconsider Decision. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 197-205). 
II.   STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 26, 2017, the parties attended mediation in the current matter with Judge Dunn.  
(R. Vol. 3 p. 21 ¶2). Throughout the course of the current matter and during the July 26, 2017, 
Defendants were represented by Yvonne Dunbar. (Ex. pp. 1-6; R. Vol. 3 p. 240 ¶3, p. 250 ¶2). 
Dinius was not acting in a pro se capacity at any time during the current litigation or the 
mediation. Id. 
 




During the mediation, Dinius and Dunbar sat in a room together.  (R. Vol. 3 p. 240 ¶¶4-5 
p. 250 ¶¶3-4). The room did not have any windows facing the hallway. Id. As such, from the 
room, they could not see into the hallway. Id. Based upon statements by Judge Dunn, it was their 
understanding that Kosmann and his counsel, Loren Messerly, were located in another room. Id. 
Throughout the mediation, Judge Dunn came into the room where Dinius and Dunbar were 
located and he would discuss information, arguments, or requests he received from Kosmann and 
Messerly. (R. Vol. 3 p. 240 ¶6 p. 250 ¶5).  Judge Dunn’s comments during the mediation 
established that any information he was relaying was on behalf of both Kosmann and Messerly. 
Id. Therefore, throughout the mediation, it was understood that both Kosmann and Messerly 
consented to all information and requests shared with Dinius and Dunbar. Id. 
During the mediation, the parties discussed a possible settlement of $40,000 with 
confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses. (R. Vol. 3 p. 192-193 ¶7, p. 199 ¶4). Initially, 
Dinius and Dunbar believed an agreement may have been reached; however, before the 
purported settlement was finalized with complete, definite, and certain material terms, the 
mediator came back in the room and informed Dinius and Dunbar that Kosmann and Messerly 
requested language in the settlement agreement which would specify the basis for any settlement 
payments to Kosmann. Id. According to the mediator, Kosmann was concerned that the parties in 
other litigation, including the Gilbride v. Kosmann matter and Kosmann v. McCarthy matter, 
could utilize any settlement payment to him as an offset. Id. Dunbar explained to the mediator 
that they would not include such language in the agreement as it could become complicated and 
because it was unnecessary under Idaho law. (R. Vol. 3 p. 192-193 ¶7). In particular, Idaho law 
precluded any offsets from any settlement because there was no joint and several liability 
between Dinius and Gilbride or McCarthy.  Id. 
 




Judge Dunn asked Dunbar to explain this directly to Messerly in the hallway. (R. Vol. 3 
p. 193-194 ¶8). Dunbar agreed to do so and went into the hallway. Id.  She initially informed 
Messerly that she was pulling up the pertinent statutes on her phone so they could discuss them.  
Id. Before she completed this task, Messerly demanded yet another additional term to the 
settlement, specifically that he be included on the release to personally protect him from Dinius’ 
potentially litigation against him. Id. Such a term had not previously been discussed by the 
parties or brought to Dinius and Dunbar’s attention during the mediation. (R. Vol. 3 p. 194-195 
¶10). Dunbar declined the inclusion of this additional term. (R. Vol. 3 p. 193-194 ¶8). 
In response, Messerly became hostile and started raising his voice. Id. He loudly stated 
that no settlement would occur unless he was personally released from any liability.  Id. This 
statement prompted Dunbar to explain to Messerly that his new position created a conflict of 
interest between him and his client. Id. By demanding his personal release and stating that a 
settlement with his client would not occur unless he was also personally released, Messerly was 
putting his personal interests before his client’s interests, which is a conflict of interest under the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Dunbar explained this to Messerly. Id. Judge Dunn was 
present in the hallway and also informed Messerly that he agreed with Dunbar’s explanation as 
to the existence of a conflict of interest. (R. Vol. 3 p. 194 ¶9). The only individuals present in the 
hallway were Dunbar, Messerly, and Judge Dunn. Id. 
Despite the potential conflict of interest, Messerly continued his demand, which was not 
a part of his client’s prior settlement requests. (R. Vol. 3 p. 193-194 ¶8). Immediately before he 
walked away, Messerly specifically withdrew any potential settlement and informed Dunbar that 
there was no settlement since he would not be personally released in any settlement agreement. 
Id.  After Messerly went back into the room where he and Kosmann had been sitting, Dunbar 
 




and Judge Dunn returned to the room where she and Dinius had been sitting during the 
mediation. (R. Vol. 3 p. 199 ¶4). Dunbar then informed Dinius about the conversation with 
Messerly. Id. Judge Dunn informed Dunbar and Dinius that such a request had not been brought 
to his attention previously during the mediation. (R. Vol. 3 p. 194-195 ¶10, p. 199 ¶4).  
Therefore, the initial demand was made by Messerly, not by Kosmann. Id. Judge Dunn then left 
the room to go speak with Messerly and Kosmann.   
Due to Messerly’s statement that there was no settlement if he was not personally 
released, Dunbar and Dinius understood the parties had not reached a final and complete 
settlement and, to the extent there could have been a settlement, Messerly repudiated the same on 
his client’s behalf. (R. Vol. 3 p. 195 ¶11, p. 200 ¶5). Therefore, they understood that Judge Dunn 
was continuing to meet with the parties and their counsel to see if he could still garner a 
settlement. Id. 
Shortly thereafter and over the course of about 15 to 30 minutes, Judge Dunn came into 
the conference room where Dinius and Dunbar were seated, to see if Dinius would go into the 
hallway to talk to Mr. Kosmann. (R. Vol. 3 p. 195 ¶12, p. 200 ¶6). At all times, Dinius and 
Dunbar were under the impression that Judge Dunn had been speaking with both Kosmann and 
Messerly. Id. Initially, Judge Dunn said. Kosmann wanted Dinius to “look him in the eye and 
promise he would not sue Messerly.” Id. Dinius refused to do that. Id. Next, Judge Dunn said 
Kosmann wanted Dinius to say he had no present intention to sue Messerly. Id. Dinius again 
refused. Id. Finally, Judge Dunn asked if Dinius would simply sit down with Kosmann to just 
talk. Id. Judge Dunn assured Dinius and Dunbar that Kosmann was not demanding any particular 
statements by Dinius. Id.  Given Judge Dunn’s insistence and permission for the parties to meet, 
Dinius agreed to meet alone with Kosmann. (R. Vol. 3 p. 241 ¶9). 
 




At all times, neither Dinius nor Dunbar had reason to believe Messerly was unaware of 
the meeting. (R. Vol. 3 p. 195-196 ¶14, p. 200 ¶7, p. 240-241 ¶¶6, 8, p. 250-251 ¶¶5-6). Instead, 
they believed the interactions were continued as before, where Judge Dunn met jointly with 
Kosmann and his counsel and then relayed their joint requests or comments to Dunbar and 
Dinius. Id. Given the practice which had transpired during the mediation, Dunbar and Dinius 
believed Messerly was involved with the discussions between Judge Dunn and Kosmann and 
was aware of Kosmann’s requests to speak directly with Mr. Dinius.  Id. 
Based upon that understanding, Dinius agreed to meet with Kosmann. (R. Vol. 3 p. 241 
¶9). Judge Dunn led Dinius to an office across the hall to meet with Kosmann. (R. Vol. 3 p. 200 
¶7). During that meeting, Kosmann did not mention that his attorney was unaware of the meeting 
or that their meeting was not sanctioned by his attorney.  During the meeting, Kosmann and 
Dinius “cleared the air.” (R. Vol. 3 p. 200-201 ¶8).  Kosmann apologized for suing Dinius and 
stated he was hearing so many different stories, he didn’t know what to believe. (R. Vol. 3 p. 242 
¶11). After they “cleared the air” and attempted to mend their prior friendship, Kosmann 
expressed to Dinius that he wanted to settle and be done with this case. (R. Vol. 3 p. 200-201 ¶8, 
p. 200-201 ¶8p. 242 ¶11). Dinius asked Kosmann what he wanted to settle their dispute. (R. Vol. 
3 p. 200-201 ¶8, p. 242 ¶11). He stated that he wanted a settlement for as much as he could get 
because he was paying Messerly monthly and money was tight for him.  (R. Vol. 3 p. 200-201 
¶8). Dinius asked him if the approximately $32,000 being held by the court would resolve the 
claims – in addition to a full release of all claims – including claims against Messerly. (R. Vol. 3 
p. 200-201 ¶8, p. 242 ¶11). Kosmann responded that he was in agreement with settling the case 
in exchange for payment to him in the amount being held by the court (although the source of 
this payment was left to be determined); a mutual release between Dinius and Kosmann; and a 
 




release of Messerly from any potential claims of contribution and/or indemnity Dinius may have.  
(R. Vol. 3 p. 200-201 ¶8). During their meeting, Kosmann did not request any further settlement 
sums and specifically did not request $40,000, despite the fact that the parties had previously 
discussed that number. (R. Vol. 3 p. 201 ¶9, p. 242 ¶11). 
While Dinius and Kosmann were meeting, Messerly went into the hall and learned the 
meeting was transpiring from Judge Dunn. (Ex. p. 3 L. 6:1-6). Messerly did not interrupt the 
meeting or otherwise prevent it from continuing. Id.  Instead, Messerly went back into his room 
and waited for the return of his client. Id. 
After Dinius and Kosmann’s meeting, the parties went back to their respective rooms and 
met with their respective attorneys. (R. Vol. 3 p. 92 ¶37, p.94 ¶46, Ex. p. 6 L6:4-6). Kosmann 
and Messerly discussed the settlement reached by Kosmann and Dinius.  (R. Vol. 3 p. 76 ¶46). 
According to Messerly, during that discussion: 
I [Messerly] then told Kosmann that he had two options: 1) we would fight to get 
the $40,000 settlement and enforce it, through more mediation that day or likely 
through a motion practice, with the unfortunate belief that Judge Dunn would do 
whatever he could to support the other side; or 2) he could take the $32,000 and 
be done but I would put on the record that I had not asked for Dinius’ verbal 
release and also the other highly irregular things that had happened during the 
mediation. . . .  
Kosmann wanted to be done and did not want to have to litigate for many more 
weeks to try and get back his $40,000 settlement. So he chose the 2nd option.  
(R. Vol. 3 p. 76 ¶¶46-47). Therefore, after receiving counsel from his attorney, Kosmann 
voluntarily decided to proceed with the settlement arrangement he discussed with Dinius. Id. 
After the parties had an opportunity to meet with their counsel, the parties’ agreement 
was placed on the record by Judge Dunn. (R. Vol. 3 p. 76-77 ¶¶46-49). As is set forth in the 
 




transcript of the audio record, the mediation resulted in a successful settlement with the 
following agreed upon terms: 
 The Plaintiff would receive a payment equal to the sum (approximately 
$32,047.19) being held by the court in Canyon County Case No. CV-2013-795.   
The Plaintiff would receive those monies via a combination of the following: (1) a 
partial payment to him by the Defendants’ insurance company3; and (2) through a 
release of a portion of the funds held by the court to him.  A portion of the funds 
held by the court would be released to Kevin Dinius in an amount equal to that 
which is paid by the Defendants’ insurance company to Plaintiff.   
 The parties agreed to keep the settlement terms confidential and that the written 
settlement agreement would contain a confidentiality clause. 
 The parties agreed to not disparage one another and that the written settlement 
agreement would contain a non-disparagement clause. 
 There will be a complete release and dismissal of any and all claims between the 
parties, with each party to bear its own costs and fees.   
 The Defendants agreed not to pursue any indemnification claims against 
Kosmann’s current counsel, Loren Messerly, with regard to Kosmann’s claim that 
the Defendants failed to timely file litigation against real estate agent Justin 
McCarthy.   
(Ex. pp. 1-6; R. Vol. 3 p. 21 ¶2).   
After Judge Dunn identified the terms of the agreement, he allowed each party and their 
respective counsel to make statements on the record. (Ex. pp. 1-6). In an effort to protect himself 
from a potential conflict-of-interest issue with his client, Messerly made numerous statements to 
establish that he did not request his personal release which was part of the settlement. (Ex. pp. 2-
3 L. 4:13-7:21, R. Vol. 3 p. 77 ¶48). In particular, he explained he did not ask his client to seek 
the release during the Kosmann-Dinius meeting and, in fact, he did not initially know about and 
was not present for that meeting. (Ex. pp. 2-3 L. 4:13-7:21). Contrary to Kosmann’s contentions 
                                                 
3 The insurer’s portion of the payment was later clarified to be $15,000, thus Defendants 
were to receive $15,000 of the funds held by the District Court. 
 




on appeal, Messerly did not make these statements as a way of objecting to the meeting. Id. He 
also did not claim the meeting constituted an ethical violation or resulted in an unenforceable 
agreement. Id. To the contrary, Messerly stated on the record “And I understand the clients can 
meet with other clients.” (Ex. pp. 3 L. 7:4-5). This statement alone establishes the lack of any 
objection to the meeting at the time the settlement was entered on the record. 
 When Kosmann was able to speak, he explained his decision to voluntarily settle as 
follows:  
I’ll express the same things I expressed with Kevin [Dinius]. It is my hope to be 
done today. And I want to move forward with my life. I feel comfortable with the 
agreement that I made with Kevin just from man to man, besides all the legal 
stuff. Would I prefer having more money? Yes. But I also want my peace of 
mind. And I want to continue with my lawyer, Loren [Messerly], to go on to the 
litigation that I have ahead of me. And I want bygones to be bygones between 
Kevin and I so that we can end on good terms and we can – we can both move on 
with our lives. 
This did not end the way we wanted it to end today. But from just man to man, 
today was the day that, you know, it’s time to move on and be done. And I’m – 
I’m happy with it.  Loren had to protect himself for those types of things. I want 
him to protect himself. Probably didn’t do what he asked. But I’m doing this for 
my own accord because today is the day to move forward. 
(Ex. p. 3 L. 8:4-23). 
Judge Dunn asked defense counsel to prepare the written settlement agreement 
memorializing what was placed on the record. (Ex. p. 5 L. 13:3-5)  As is set forth in the oral 
recording, the parties intended to be bound by the terms of the settlement prior to the drafting 
and execution of a contemplated written settlement agreement. (Ex. pp. 1-5). 
Defense counsel did as requested and prepared several versions of a written settlement 
agreement. (R. Vol. 3 p. 22-24 ¶¶4-10). Despite Defendants’ best efforts to draft a release 
mirroring the transcript, Messerly continually refused to have Kosmann sign any draft of the 
 




agreement and, instead, stated the Defendants needed to proceed with the Motion to Enforce 
Settlement.  (R. Vol. 3 p. 22-24 ¶¶4-10, p. 51). That motion was thereafter filed.  
III.   ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
 Whether the Plaintiff’s appeal should be disregarded to the extent the Plaintiff raises 
issues not argued before the District Court.    
 Whether the Plaintiff’s appeal should be disregarded to the extent the Plaintiff raises 
issues which were not timely presented below. 
 Whether the Plaintiff’s appeal should be disregarded to the extent the Plaintiff raises 
issues he waived before the District Court. 
 Whether the Plaintiff’s appeal should be disregarded to the extent the Plaintiff does not 
properly support arguments on appeal. 
IV.   ARGUMENT 
Kosmann’s briefing is a bit difficult to follow, given the order in which his various 
arguments were presented and due to his failure to present cogent arguments and legal authority 
for each issue he references. With that being said, it appears he is essentially arguing the District 
Court erred by declining Kosmann’s request for sanctions; the District Court erred by enforcing 
the settlement placed on the record; and the District Court erred in imposing a $200 sanction 
against Kosmann’s counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the District Court’s rulings were 
proper and should be affirmed. 
 




A. Kosmann’s Appeal Should be Disregarded in Several Respects 
1. Kosmann’s Appeal Should be Disregarded to the Extent it Raises Issues Not 
Argued Below  
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that matters not raised below will not be 
considered on appeal. See e.g. Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 461 (2014) (“With the exception 
of jurisdictional issues, ‘[a]n argument not raised below and not supported in the briefs is waived 
on appeal’”).  Here, Kosmann presents the following arguments for the first time on appeal: 
 Kosmann is entitled to recover as sanctions $8,000, see Appellant’s Brief, p. 34; 
 The settlement placed on the record is unenforceable due to substantive and 
procedural unconscionability, see Appellant’s Brief, p. 37, ftnt. 3 
 Defendants should be sanctioned for an alleged abuse of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11, see Appellant’s Brief, p. 40-41; and  
 If the appeal is granted, Judge Petty should be disqualified from this matter. See 
Appellant’s Brief, p. 42. 
As these arguments were not raised by Kosmann below; they are not properly before this Court 
and should not be considered on appeal.  See e.g. Zylstra, 157 Idaho at 461. 
2. Kosmann’s Appeal Should be Disregarded to the Extent it Raises Issues Not 
Timely Presented Below 
The Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have also declined to consider 
issues on appeal which were not properly or timely brought to the District Court’s attention.  See 
e.g. Taylor v. Riley, 162 Idaho 692, 703–04 (2017) (holding, even though the district court 
considered a the motion to reconsider, it lacked jurisdiction to do so because the motion was not 
timely filed; and, due to the untimely filing, the Court the district court’s “denial of the motion 
for reconsideration is not an issue for consideration on appeal, nor can the documents submitted 
 




with that motion be considered on appeal”) Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571 (2004) 
(finding a request for judicial notice was not properly before the Court as it was not timely raised 
in the district court proceeding); Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 
87 (Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted) (ruling “Because that issue was not timely raised before 
the district court, we decline to consider it here”).   
Here, Kosmann’s Appellant’s Brief is replete with arguments which were not properly 
and timely raised below, including the following:  
 The settlement agreement placed on the record is unenforceable due to a failure of 
consideration, fraud, and mistake, see Appellant’s Brief, p. 37, ftnt. 3; and 
 The District Court’s award of sanctions against Kosmann violates the “safe harbor 
provision” of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2). See Appellant’s Brief, p. 39. 
With regard to the contract-based arguments, Kosmann failed to timely and properly raise 
them below. Instead, he referenced these legal theories, without providing any actual analysis or 
argument in support, in his untimely Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Reconsider.  
With regard to the Rule 11(c)(2), Kosmann did not timely raise the issue because he waited until 
he filed his reply brief in support of his motion to reconsider to mention it.   
In a recent decision, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to consider a motion to reconsider which was not timely filed under Rule 
11(a)(2)(B).  See Taylor, 162 Idaho at 703–04.  Similar to that holding, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has made clear that any memorandum, affidavits, or arguments lodged in support of a motion to 
reconsider must also be filed within the Rule 11(a)(2)(B) 14-day deadline.  See e.g. Marek v. 
Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 221 (2016); Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 642 
 




(2014).  More specifically, the Court in Franklin Bldg. Supply Co., 157 Idaho at 642, addressed 
the 14-day deadline contained in the predecessor rule and held: 
A party cannot sidestep the requirement to file a motion within a certain period by 
filing an unsupported motion and promising support down the road. See Kuhn v. 
Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 248, 245 P.3d 992, 1000 (2010) 
(holding that motions for a new trial were untimely where the movant filed the 
motions within the fourteen-day period dictated by the rule, but did not provide 
factual support for the motions until after the period expired, “[b]ecause there was 
no factual support filed in support of these motions within the fourteen-day period 
prescribed by the rule”). Rule 11(a)(2)(B) does not require that a movant support 
a motion for reconsideration with an affidavit. A movant who does so, however, 
must serve the affidavit with the motion and within the period of time for filing of 
the motion. 
Furthermore, this Court has held that arguments which are raised by a moving party for the first 
time in a reply brief, rather than in the initial brief, are not properly before the Court. Jacklin 
Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242, 248 (2011).   
While there is no Idaho case law on point, other jurisdictions have held, while a motion to 
reconsider allows a court to consider additional facts or new law, it cannot be utilized to present 
“a new legal theory for the first time or to raise legal arguments which could have been raised in 
connection with the original motion.”  In re JSJF Corp., 344 B.R. 94, 103 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006), 
aff'd and remanded, 277 F. App’x 718 (9th Cir. 2008); see also First Bank & Tr. of Idaho v. 
Parker Bros., 112 Idaho 30, 32, 730 P.2d 950, 952 (1986) (“Discovery of new legal theories does 
not constitute grounds for bringing a 60(b) motion”).    
 Pursuant to the above-referenced case law, the aforementioned arguments should be 
disregarded and not considered on appeal because they were not properly and timely raised 
before the District Court. 
 




3. Kosmann’s Appeal Should be Disregarded to the Extent it Raises Issues He 
Conceded Below 
The Idaho Supreme has held that matters which are conceded before the trial court will 
not be considered on appeal.  See e.g. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017), reh’g 
denied (Nov. 17, 2017).  On appeal, Kosmann admits he conceded that his motion to reconsider 
memorandum and affidavits were not timely filed. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 41, ftnt. 5. Despite 
that concession, Kosmann now asks this Court to review whether the District Court erred in 
finding the pleadings were untimely filed.  See Appellant’s Brief, p. 41. Given Kosmann’s prior 
concessions, this issue should be disregarded on appeal.  
4. Kosmann’s Appeal Should be Disregarded to the Extent Kosmann failed to 
Properly Support the Arguments Raised in his Appellant’s Brief 
It is clearly established in Idaho that issues which are raised, but not adequately briefed, 
on appeal will be disregarded by this Court.  In fact, this Court has held: “Regardless of whether 
an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is 
only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be 
considered by this Court.”  Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374 (2010); see also H.F.L.P., LLC 
v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 686 (2014); Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 
48 (2014). 
In his Appellant’s Brief, Kosmann makes several conclusory arguments without properly 
providing any cogent argument or authority to support the same.  The conclusory arguments 
include the following: 
 The District Court erred in holding the Idaho State Bar, rather than the District 
Court, should resolve allegations of IRPC violations, see Appellant’s Brief, p. 32-34; 
 




 The District Court erred in enforcing the settlement agreement placed on the record, 
see Appellant’s Brief, p. 37-38 
 This Court should find that contract-related defenses, such as public policy, failure 
of consideration, fraud, mistake, and procedural and substantive unconscionability, 
invalidate the settlement agreement entered on the record see Appellant’s Brief, p. 
37; and  
 Judge Petty should be disqualified or replaced if this matter is remanded.  See 
Appellant’s Brief, p. 42. 
Given Kosmann’s failure to support these issues with cogent argument and appeal, they should 
not be considered on appeal. See e.g. Liponis, 149 Idaho at 374. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Declined Kosmann’s Requested Sanctions Against 
Defendants  
In his brief, Kosmann claims the District Court erred in declining to impose sanctions 
against Defendants and their counsel.  This issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
A court has discretion in determining whether to sanction a party and its counsel and a 
decision to sanction will not be overruled unless the court clearly abused its discretion.  See e.g. 
Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 810, 819 (2016).   
“The test for determining whether a judge abused his or her discretion is (1) 
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. at 610, 301 P.3d at 268. 
Id.  If all three factors exist, the district court’s ruling must be upheld. 
Here, Judge Petty properly perceived the issues of sanctions as one of discretion; he acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and he 
 




reached his decision by an exercise of discretion.  Therefore, his decision denying the sanctions 
requested by Kosmann must be affirmed. 
1. The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Ruling that the Case 
Presented a Matter of First Impression 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order and its Cross-Motions for Sanctions Decision, 
the District Court held it was a matter of first impression in Idaho whether an attorney-litigant 
who was represented by other counsel was “representing a client” for the purposes of Idaho Rule 
of Professional Conduct 4.2. Contrary to Kosmann’s argument, this holding was not an abuse of 
discretion. Instead, it was accurate as such an issue was not previously addressed by an Idaho 
appellate court.   
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained an issue is a matter of first impression where it 
was not expressly decided by it, the Idaho Supreme Court. See Blake v. Starr, 146 Idaho 847, 
852 (2009) (“This appeal sought determination of an issue not heretofore expressly decided by 
this Court and therefore involved a case of first impression”).  In Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 
129 Idaho 419 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court only addressed whether an attorney acting pro 
se, that is, whether an attorney-litigant who was representing himself and did not have other 
counsel, was “representing a client” under IRPC 4.2.  The Idaho Supreme Court did not address, 
in Runsvold or in any other case, whether an attorney-litigant who was represented by counsel 
was “representing a client” under IRPC 4.2.  Therefore, the precise issue before the District 
Court was not previously addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Accordingly, the issue was a 
matter of first impression and the District Court did not err so holding. 
 




2. The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Failing to Award 
Sanctions Against Defendants 
a. A Determination of whether IRPC 4.2 was Violated was Not Necessary 
for the District Court to Rule on the Issues Before It 
Kosmann claims the District Court erred in finding that no ethical violation occurred as a 
result of the Kosmann-Dinius meeting. However, the District Court made no such ruling; in fact, 
the District Court did not rule on the issue at all. Instead, the Court held “[w]hether Dinius’s 
meeting with Kosmann violated IRPC 4.2 is not clearly settled under Idaho law.”  Given that the 
Court did not actually rule that no ethical violation had occurred, Kosmann’s request to have the 
Idaho Supreme Court review a non-existent decision is without merit and should be denied. 
It should also be noted that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because a final 
determination regarding whether an ethical violation had occurred was not necessary to the 
matters before it. First, the District Court did not need to determine whether IRPC 4.2 was 
actually violated when ruling on Kosmann’s argument that the settlement was void for public 
policy.  Instead, the Court simply assumed a violation had occurred and then determined whether 
the assumed violation voided the settlement agreement for public policy reasons.  Notably, 
Kosmann has not presented argument on appeal that the District Court erred in determining the 
settlement agreement was not void for public policy reasons. 
Next, the District Court did not need to determine whether IRPC 4.2 was actually 
violated when it ruled on Kosmann’s motion for sanctions. Kosmann moved for sanctions 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure govern when a 
district court can sanction a party of his counsel.  Those Rules provide only limited bases for the 
imposition of sanctions. For instance, Rule 11 provides for sanctions where a party files frivolous 
pleadings; Rule 16 allows a court to sanction a party where the party fails to obey a pretrial order 
 




and/or participate in good faith during a scheduling conference; and Rule 37 provides for 
sanctions for discovery-related violations.  Noticeably missing from these Rules is any reference 
to the IRPC.  This is because the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and, in particular, Rule 11 does 
not provide a district court with the ability to sanction a party and/or his counsel due to alleged 
violations of the IRPC.   
Accordingly, the Court correctly focused on the sanction requirements set forth in IRCP 
11(b) and (c). In doing so, the District Court correctly analyzed whether the Defendants 
presented nonfriviolous arguments based upon a good faith belief.  The Court also properly 
exercised its discretion when it ruled the Defendants had not acted in bad faith and had not 
presented frivolous arguments in support of its motion to enforce the settlement. Notably, on 
appeal, Kosmann does not seek to have this Court review the District Court’s determination that 
IRCP 11 was not violated by Dinius and Dunbar. For this reasons and because Rule 11 was the 
basis for Kosmann’s underlying motion for sanctions, Kosmann has waived his right to appeal 
the District Court’s denial of sanctions against Defendants. 
b. The Record Does Not Contain Clear and Convincing Evidence of a 
Violation of IRPC 4.2 
On appeal, Kosmann only argues that the District Court erred in failing to find an IRPC 
4.2 violation based upon his belief that Runsvold dictated such a ruling. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 
32. As explained above, because Runsvold is a distinguishable case, it did not mandate that the 
District Court automatically hold IRPC 4.2 was violated. For this reason and because Kosmann 
does not present any argument as to why, independent of the Runsvold holding, he believes IRPC 
4.2 was violated, his appeal fails. In failing to present argument proving an independent basis for 
the alleged IRPC 4.2 violation, Kosmann waives any such argument on appeal.   
 




Regardless of whether the issue is waived, Kosmann’s appeal still fails because the 
record does not support a finding of an IRPC 4.2 violation. Violations of the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.  See e.g. Idaho State 
Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, 355 (2012).  IRPC 4.2 reads:  
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
Several courts, including the Idaho Supreme Court, have interpreted “in representing a 
client” “to include the situation in which an attorney is acting pro se...” Runsvold, 129 Idaho at 
421.  In so holding, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled “a pro se lawyer/litigant does represent a 
client when representing himself or herself in a matter; thus, I.R.P.C. 4.2 applies to prevent the 
pro se attorney from directly contacting a represented opposing party.” See id. As explained in 
Runsvold, an attorney is acting pro se where he represents himself in a matter and is not 
represented by other counsel.  See id.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“pro se” 
is defined as “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; without a lawyer”).   
At the time of Dinius’ communication with Kosmann, he was not acting pro se.  (Ex. pp. 
1-6; R. Vol. 3 p. 240 ¶3, p. 250 ¶2). Instead, Dinius was, and has been throughout this litigation, 
represented by independent counsel. Id. Notably, no Idaho court has found IRPC 4.2 applicable 
to situations where an attorney-party is represented by counsel, rather than acting pro se.  This is 
because, unlike an attorney who is acting pro se, an attorney who is represented by other counsel 
is not “representing a client” and is not representing himself/herself. Rather, the attorney is being 
represented by another lawyer. As Dinius was not “representing a client” when he communicated 
with Kosmann, IRPC 4.2 is inapplicable and did not prohibit the communication.  Id. 
 




Similarly, because Dinius was a represented party and was not “representing a client”, his 
communication with Kosmann was warranted by Comment 4 of IRPC 4.2. Comment 4 provides: 
“[p]arties to a matter may communicate directly with each other...”  Importantly, Comment 4 is 
not limited to non-attorney parties; instead, it encompasses all parties, including attorney-parties 
who are represented and are not acting pro se. 
The evidence also establishes that, even if IRPC 4.2 were triggered (which it is not), 
Dinius’ communication was allowable by the exceptions contained in the final parenthetical of 
the Rule, which provides: “unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized 
to do so by law or a court order.” Both exceptions existed when Dinius met with Kosmann. First, 
it is and has always been undisputed, that the Kosmann-Dinius communication was authorized 
by an oral court order. (Ex. p. 4, L. 10:9-16; R. Vol. 3 p. 195 ¶12, p. 200 ¶6, p. 241 ¶9, p. 251 
¶6). As Kosmann admitted, Judge Dunn facilitated, authorized and encouraged the 
communication between Dinius and Kosmann during the mediation. (Id.; R. Vol. 3 p. 335 (“A 
sitting district judge, the mediator, had authorized the meeting...”). On the record, Judge Dunn 
explained he allowed the communication because “clients can meet if they wish”. (Ex. p. 4, L. 
10:9-16). 
Next, Messerly, by way of his conduct, provided inferred or implied consent to the 
communication. Below, Messerly testifies he not only allowed, but actually directed Kosmann to 
communicate his and Kosmann’s joint position to Judge Dunn. (R. Vol. 3, p. 310 ¶8). By 
directing such communication, Messerly provided his inferred or implied consent to any 
statements made by Kosmann to Judge Dunn, including Kosmann’s requests to speak directly 
with Dinius.  
 




Throughout the mediation, Messerly also provided Judge Dunn with his actual consent to 
relay his and Kosmann’s statements and requests to Dinius and his counsel.  (R. Vol. 3 p. 240 ¶6 
p. 250 ¶5). Messerly was aware Judge Dunn was a relaying such statements on his and 
Kosmann’s behalf.  Based upon Messerly’s testimony, he intended or at least was aware Judge 
Dunn would share Kosmann’s communications with Dinius and his counsel.  Under the 
circumstances, Messerly provided his inferred or implied consent to the meeting Kosmann 
requested with Dinius and, therefore, to Dinius’ communication with Kosmann. 
For these reasons, the record does not support clear and convincing evidence of an IRPC 
4.2 violation and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to rule that such a 
violation existed. 
c. The District Court Did Not Deny Kosmann’s Motion for Sanctions Due to 
Any Settlement Agreement by Kosmann 
On appeal, Kosmann claims the District Court erred in denying his motion for sanctions 
on the basis that Kosmann voluntarily agreed to the settlement on the record.  However, a review 
of the Court’s Cross-Motions for Sanctions Decision and its Motion to Reconsider Decision 
establishes that this was not one of the bases provided by the Court in denying Kosmann’s 
motion for sanctions. In fact, the District Court’s rulings on Kosmann’s motion for sanctions do 
not even mention the settlement placed on the record or whether Kosmann voluntarily agreed to 
the same.  Accordingly, this argument by Kosmann does not provide a basis for questioning the 
District Court’s decision to deny sanctions against the Defendants 
d. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Holding the IRPC Do 
Not Provide a Basis for It to Sanction Parties 
On appeal, Kosmann claims the District Court erred in holding that the Idaho State Bar, 
rather than the Court, was the proper forum for his allegations of IRPC violations. This issue 
 




should be disregarded because he fails to properly support this argument. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has routinely held that it will not consider issues on appeal which are not supported by 
both cogent argument and authority. See e.g. Liponis, 149 Idaho at 374. Here, Kosmann only 
claims the District Court erred because the holding was illogical. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 33-34. 
Kosmann, however, does not support his position with any cogent argument and legal authority 
to support his argument. Id. In particular, Kosmann fails to cite any Idaho case or court rule 
granting Idaho district court’s the ability to sanction parties or their counsel for alleged IRPC 
violations. Id. Due to his failure to properly support this argument, it should be disregarded on 
appeal.  See e.g. Liponis, 149 Idaho at 374. 
It should also be noted that this issue does not provide a valid basis for reversing the 
District Court’s decision to decline sanctions against Defendants.  In his Motion for Sanctions, 
Kosmann sought an award of sanctions against Defendants under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 11. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 220-234). Specifically he argued sanctions should be imposed because he 
claimed Defendants purportedly violated Rule 11 when they sought to enforce the settlement 
reached as a result of their alleged IRPC 4.2 violations. Id. Kosmann did not seek to have the 
Court impose sanctions pursuant to any independent authority allegedly contained in the IRPC or 
otherwise.  Id. Therefore, any decision by the District Court in this regard is mere dicta and does 
not present a basis for reversing its decision to decline to award sanctions against Defendants. 
Moreover, to the extent this Court is inclined to allow Kosmann to proceed with this 
argument despite the lack of support, it should be noted that the District Court correctly 
exercised its discretion when it reviewed applicable law and determined the IRPC and the 
statutes addressing the attorney disciplinary process do not provide from the imposition of 
sanctions by a district court.  (R. Vol. 2 p. 170-171).  “The Rules [of Professional Conduct] are 
 




designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct 
through disciplinary agencies.”  IRPC SCOPE.  Pursuant to I.C. §3-401, et seq., the Idaho State 
Bar and Idaho Supreme Court, not a district court, have jurisdiction to determine whether a Rule 
has been violated and, if so, whether an attorney should be disciplined. See also Idaho State Bar 
v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, 355 (2012). Pursuant to I.C. § 3-412, the Board of Commissioners, with 
the approval of the Idaho Supreme Court, established rules, namely the Idaho Bar Commission 
Rules, which “govern[] procedure in cases and investigations involving alleged misconduct of 
members of the Idaho State Bar.”  See IBCR 500-525.  While the procedure provides for review 
by the Idaho Supreme Court, the rules do not provide any review by an Idaho district court. 
IBCR 509. Under the circumstances, the District Court correctly applied Idaho law in 
determining that the District Court was not the proper forum for IRPC violation claims. 
e. The District Court did Not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to Award the 
Sanctions Identified by Kosmann on Appeal 
 On appeal, Kosmann claims the District Court erred because he should have been 
awarded monetary sanctions as a result of the alleged IRPC violations.  Kosmann’s argument 
fails because Kosmann moved for sanctions under Rule 11 and he does not appeal the District 
Court’s determination that Defendants and their counsel did not violate Rule 11.  (R. Vol. 3 pp. 
220-234). Due to the lack of a Rule 11 violation, sanctions were not recoverable. 
Next, Kosmann is barred from seeking an award of $8,000 from this Court because he 
did not raise that issue below.  In Kosmann’s Motion for Sanctions, he requested four specific 
sanctions against Dunbar and Dinius. (R. Vol. 3 pp. 228, 232). An award of $8,000 was not 
among his requests.  Id. Accordingly, such a request should not be considered by this Court. See 
e.g. Zylstra, 157 Idaho at 461. 
 




Moreover, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kosmann’s sanction 
requests because the sanctions he sought were not recoverable for an IRPC violation. Idaho Bar 
Commission Rule 506 identifies the only sanctions which may be imposed by the Idaho State 
Bar and/or the Idaho Supreme Court when there exists clear and convincing evidence of an IRPC 
violation.  The enumerated available sanctions do not include any of the sanctions requested by 
Kosmann.  Consequently, the application of the rule of construction expressio unius thus bars the 
requested sanctions.  See e.g. Local 1494 of Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 
99 Idaho 630, 639 (1978) (“It is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a 
constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all 
others”).  Moreover, the SCOPE of the IRPC specifically provides that a “violation of a Rule 
does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy...” such as what are requested by 
Kosmann. 
For the reasons set forth herein, Kosmann’s appeal of the District Court’s decision not to 
impose sanctions against Defendants and their counsel should be denied and the District Court’s 
decision should be affirmed. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Settlement Agreement Entered on the 
Record was Enforceable 
On appeal, Kosmann claims the District Court erred in finding the settlement agreement 
placed on the record was valid and enforceable.  However, Kosmann offers no cogent analysis or 
legal authority for why he claims such a decision was “contrary to law.”  A review of the District 
Court’s decision establishes that it correctly applied Idaho law and the facts at issue when it 
determined that settlement agreements were enforceable; that the Transcript of Mediated 
Agreement identified an agreement to settle by all parties; that the Dinius-Kosmann meeting did 
 




not violate public policy; and that the agreement was not void for a public policy violation.  (R. 
Vol. 2 pp. 142-153). Notably, Kosmann does not specifically assign error to any of these 
findings. See Appellant’s Brief, pp.37-38. By failing to specifically appeal these issues, Kosmann 
waives his ability to do so. See e.g. Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 
299, 313 (2010) (holding “We will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument 
and authority in the opening brief”). Notably, Kosmann’s vague and conclusory reference to 
potential contract-related defenses is not sufficient for this Court to reconsider the District 
Court’s rulings. See e.g. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168 (2014) (“A 
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both 
are lacking”).   
Because Kosmann failed to present cogent argument or authority regarding his assert of 
error by the Court, this issue cannot be considered on appeal. 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Sanctioning Kosmann and Messerly 
Kosmann argues the District Court erred in sanctioning him and his counsel.  This 
argument lacks merit as Kosmann cannot establish that the Court abused its discretion in 
sanctioning him. First, on page 3 of its decision, it correctly perceived the issue of sanctions as 
one of discretion. (R. Vol. 2 p. 164). Next, it acted within its boundaries of discretion because 
Rule 11 provided it with the ability to sanction a party and their counsel for the filing of not 
warranted by existing law.  It then reached its decision by an exercise of reason because it fully 
reviewed the conduct of Kosmann and its counsel and found that such conduct violated Rule 
11(b). (R. Vol. 2 p. 173-174). In particular, it determined that the filing of Kosmann’s 
supplemental brief was unwarranted because it was filed in contravention of the deadlines set 
forth in Rule 7(b)(3) and it was filed without first seeking permission under Rule 2.2(b)(1)(B).  
 




Id. In utilizing its discretion and exercising reason, the Court determined that the appropriate 
sanction was the cost the Defendants incurred in seeking to strike the supplemental briefing, 
rather than striking the supplemental briefing. Id. Given that the sanction was only $200, it was 
reasonable.  Therefore, the imposition of such a sanction should be upheld as the Court did not 
abuse its discretion in imposing the same.   
Notably, both on appeal and below, Kosmann has failed to raise any argument or cite any 
case law to support his contention that an abuse of discretion occurred. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 
38.  As explained above, Kosmann’s claim that the imposition of the sanction somehow violated 
Rule 11(c)(2) must be disregarded as it was not properly and timely raised below.  Even if the 
argument were timely raised, it does not provide a basis for reversing the District Court’s 
decision.  As the Ninth Circuit explained “The purpose of the safe harbor, however, is to give the 
offending party the opportunity, within 21 days after service of the motion for sanctions, to 
withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions.”  Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 
710 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Kosmann did not withdraw his Supplemental Brief within 21 days of 
being served with Defendants’ initial request for sanctions contained in its September 5, 2017 
Motion to Strike or at any time before the Court imposed sanctions in its November 22, 2017 
Cross Motions for Sanctions Decision. Accordingly, Rule 11(c)(2) does not bar the award of 
sanctions. 
E. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Failing to Sanction Defendants for 
Any Alleged Abuse of Rule 11 
For the first time on appeal, Kosmann seeks sanctions against Dinius and Dunbar for 
their requests for sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly, which Kosmann claims was an 
alleged abuse of Rule 11. See e.g. Zylstra, 157 Idaho at 461. As previously explained, this issue 
 




should be disregarded because it was not raised before the District Court. Kosmann’s request 
should further be disregarded because he fails to appeal the District Court’s determination that 
Defendants did not violate Rule 11.   
F. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Striking Kosmann’s Untimely Filed 
Pleadings 
As explained above, because Kosmann conceded that his memorandum and declaration 
were not timely filed, his appeal of this issue should be disregarded.  See e.g. Cohagan, 162 
Idaho at 721; Appellant’s Brief, p. 41 ftnt 5. Kosmann’s appeal should further be dismissed 
because Kosmann fails to present any argument or legal authority to support a finding that the 
District Court abused its discretion in striking those untimely pleadings. See e.g. Liponis, 149 
Idaho at 374.  Moreover, a review of the Court’s Motion to Reconsider Decision establishes that 
it did not abuse its discretion.  To the contrary, it rightly recognized the issue of striking untimely 
pleadings was a matter of its discretion; the Court reached its decision by an exercise of reason 
after reviewing applicable court rules and case law; and acted consistently with those rules and 
case law in reaching its decision.  (R. Vol. 2 pp. 184-185). 
G. The District Court Should Not be Disqualified From Further Proceedings 
Kosmann’s request to disqualify or otherwise replace Judge Petty should not be 
considered an appeal as it was not raised below and because Kosmann fails to offer any legal 
authority to support disqualification of Judge Petty.  See e.g. Zylstra, 157 Idaho at 461.  In fact, 
Kosmann does not even identify the standard applicable to such a request.  See Appellant’s Brief, 
p. 42. 
 




H. Kosmann Is Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees on Appeal 
Kosmann’s final issue on appeal is his request for attorney fees on appeal.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it will “not consider a request for 
attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal authority or argument.” Capps v. FIA Card 
Servs., N.A., 149 Idaho 737, 744 (2010) (internal citations omitted).  “Attorney fees are 
awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract or by court rule”. Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
Here, Kosmann claims he should be able to recover under contract and I.C. § 12-121 and 
because he had to litigation a purported ethical violation. Each of Kosmann’s claims fail. 
Initially, Kosmann is not entitled to attorney’s fees as he is not the prevailing party. It is 
anticipated that Kosmann’s appeal will be denied and the trial court’s decisions will be affirmed. 
Next, Kosmann has failed to identify any authority providing for an award of attorney’s 
fees based upon a draft settlement agreement which was never agreed to or signed by the parties.  
The lack of legal authority, alone, is a sufficient basis for denying Kosmann’s request. Capps, 
149 Idaho at 744.  Kosmann’s request should further be denied because it is not supported by 
facts.  Notably, the record does not contain any evidence that the draft agreement was agreed to 
or signed by the parties. To the contrary, the record reveals that it was not agreed to and that it 
was later replaced by at least 3 subsequent drafts, none of which were ever agreed to or entered 
into by the parties.  (R. Vol. 3 at 19-59). Moreover, the record establishes that Defendants sought 
to enforce the settlement agreement which was placed on the record.  (R. Vol. 2 at 110-111; R. 
Vol. 3 at 10-18). A review of the transcript of that agreement establishes that it did not contain an 
attorney fees provision. (Ex. pp. 1-6) Accordingly, Kosmann’s request for fees pursuant to 
contract law should be denied. 
 




Moreover, Kosmann is not entitled to recover fees under I.C. § 12-121 because he cannot 
establish that Defendants’ position or defense to the appeal is frivolous.  To the contrary, 
Defendants’ position and defense to Kosmann’s appeal are grounded in both law and fact.  
Kosmann’s entire appeal addresses decisions of the District Court which were favorable to 
Defendants.  Among the District Court’s favorable rulings was its determination that Defendants 
did not violate Rule 11, including that Defendants position was nonfrivolous. (R. Vol. 2 p. 168). 
Notably, Kosmann has not appealed that ruling by the District Court; therefore, he has waived 
any argument to the contrary.  Specifically, by failing to appeal this aspect of the Court’s 
findings, Kosmann is barred from establishing that Defendants’ position below or on appeal is 
frivolous.  Therefore, Kosmann is barred from recovery attorney’s fees under I.C. § 12-121.   
Finally, Kosmann is not entitled to recover fees due to his alleged “having to bring 
litigation to prove up the ethical violation.”  Notably, Kosmann fails to cite any statute or court 
rule providing for such an award; thereby nullifying his request.  Capps, 149 Idaho at 744.  As 
attorney’s fees cannot be awarded unless they are authorized by “statute or contract or by court 
rule”, Kosmann’s request must be denied.  See id. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, the District Court’s underlying decisions should be 
affirmed and Kosmann’s appeal should be dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 2018. 
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